Description:

Matthew Etchemendy (Law & Philosophy Fellow, UChicago) will workshop his paper The Hazards of Influence with us.

Abstract: This paper considers the ethics of non-rational influence, defined approximately as psychological influence that bypasses or subverts the rational capacities. The question addressed is whether a substantial case can be made against exerting non-rational influence on others’ beliefs, which is to say whether we can identify one or more broadly applicable, relatively strong pro tanto reasons to eschew such influence. Many popular arguments against non-rational influence are, I argue, non-starters: we cannot make a substantial case against non-rational influence on grounds that it represents a form of mind control, that it undermines autonomy, that it is disrespectful, or that it diminishes (or at least fails to enhance) the rational capacities of those we seek to influence. Instead, the most significant problem with non-rational influence is that it presents, at least in a wide range of cases, a greater risk of inducing error—that is, a greater risk of moving a person’s overall set of beliefs further out of alignment with an accurate and complete account of the world. Concern over this risk-of-error problem, however, justifies only a fairly weak and radically context-sensitive case against non-rational influence; it’s unclear at best whether it’s sufficient to fully vindicate the widespread pre-theoretic distaste for non-rational influence. In short, non-rational influence may have a worse reputation than it deserves.