Description:

EDGS Graduate Lecture Series

Melike Arslan, Sociology

Competition (Antitrust) laws are supposed to resolve the problems of monopolization and cartelistic organizations, and provide protection to the consumers from the abuses of the corporations. Yet, these institutional goals are hardly attained in the context of unlimited economic globalization and liberalization, especially in developing economies with less standardization in legal implementation. This presentation offers explanations for this observation by looking at the socio-political factors influencing the competition agencies’ decisions in Turkey and Mexico. I argue that the representation of economic interest, the expert jurisdictional disputes and the states’ unwillingness to release market control have led these competition agencies to pick and choose from the available competition law goals and interpretations that advance some interests, but rarely those of the consumers. I lastly present the empirical set-up of my project, the cases of Turkey and Mexico, and the implications of this study for a broader research agenda on the partial implementations of the globally dispersed and harmonized laws.