Speaker: Netanel Ben-Porath
Title: Democracy's Spoils: Populism and Misallocation of Public Goods in Jacksonian USA
Abstract: Populist leaders often argue that executive power should be centralized in their hands. Because politicians are directly accountable to the people, they, rather than unelected bureaucrats, should allocate goods. Yet this political authority can be abused for narrow electoral gain, sacrificing service quality for partisan advantage. This work studies how the election of Andrew Jackson, often referred to as the `First Populist', shaped the allocation of post offices. Contrary to Jackson’s promise of broader representation, the quality of office allocation plummeted, decreasing the average citizen's welfare. The over-supplying competitive counties and spoiling Jacksonian congressmen caused distorted provision. Furthermore, states with broader franchises saw the steepest quality declines, likely because they tended to be more competitive. These results highlight a fundamental trade-off in public‐goods provision: centralizing authority in elected hands may enhance responsiveness, but it also invites partisan distortions that can erode overall service quality.