Professor Jonathan Markowitz from the Univ. of Southern California will present his work.
ABSTRACT:
Why do some powerful states project military force to compete over resources, while others do not? This article argues that domestic institutions and economic interests influence whether states project power to compete over resources or handle their disputes purely within the confines of existing international institutions. I develop and test a theory of which states will have a stronger interest in militarily competing or cooperating over resources. I argue that democratic states that are economically reliant on exporting manufactured goods and services should have a weaker preference for military competition over resources and should therefore choose to cooperate, managing disputes solely within existing international institutions. In contrast, states that are either autocratic and/or economically dependent on resource rents will have a stronger preference for military competition over resources and will be less likely to resolve disputes within existing international institutions. These theoretical predictions are tested with a set of case studies that analyze how states reacted to an exogenous environmental shock that exposed resources in the Arctic. The findings have implications for rising powers in Asia, the political effects of climate change in the Arctic, and global energy security.
7 November, 12:00-1:30pm, Buffett Conference Room.
Cost: No cost. Lunch is provided.