"When Do Citizens Grease the Wheel? The Demand Side of Bribery"
by Jordan Gans-Morse, Associate Professor of Political Science and IPR Associate
This event is part of the 2020 Fay Lomax Cook IPR Colloquium Series.
Abstract: Corruption persists not only because public officials expect bribes but also because in many countries a large percentage of citizens are willing to pay them. Little is known, however, about the factors that affect citizens' willingness to engage in bribe transactions. Gans-Morse develops a simple microeconomic framework to examine this issue and then test the emerging hypotheses by conducting a conjoint experiment in the high-corruption context of Ukraine. He finds that citizens' propensity to bribe is particularly sensitive to competition among providers of government services, the urgency of citizens' need for a service, and the extent to which public officials have the capacity to guarantee delivery of a service in exchange for bribes.