Speaker: Davis Kedrosky
Title: The Origins of Bureaucratic Reform: Evidence from the British Civil Service
Abstract: A meritocratic civil service is considered a critical institution for successful governance, enabling competent officials to implement policy more efficiently and without political interference. Despite the potential benefits of reform, however, most historical states did not adopt 'Weberian' institutions until late in the process of economic development, if at all. Why? To answer this question, I study one of the first modern bureaucratic reforms: the 1870 Order in Council, which replaced patronage with competitive examination as the predominant mode of appointment for clerkships in the British Civil Service. Using new datasets on 40,000 British bureaucrats and over 27,000 government appointments, I show that the reform substantially changed recruitment: patronage appointments declined from nearly 80 percent in 1870 to fewer than 40 percent by 1880, while the share hired through open competition rose from zero to 50 percent. Competitive recruits were less likely to be politically connected than patronage appointments. Larger departments with more complex, specialized organizations were more likely to adopt meritocratic recruitment. I offer preliminary evidence for one explanation of bureaucratic reform: that changes in the scale and scope of government led bureaucratic managers to select applicants with more legible qualifications.