Northwestern University's Department of Philosophy's Colloquium Series presents Lidal Dror

 Broadly Misleading Evidence

This paper argues for a notion of ‘broadly misleading evidence,’ where ‘broadly misleading evidence’ has a striking propensity (in the relevant social context) to mislead people, such that we have reason to be wary of said evidence. I also argue that this broadly misleading evidence can be the basis of epistemically defective knowledge, both because the knowledge is based on evidence with a striking propensity to mislead, and because the knowledge itself has a striking propensity to mislead. Among the important upshots of this analysis is that it can help us understand important features of how both oppressive societies and criticizable scientific research go wrong. Specifically, the notion of broadly misleading evidence can help identify what’s wrong in some cases of ideological belief and ‘industrial distraction’ (research, often industry-funded, which leads us astray about some important question).

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