Advantage-Taking in the Epistemic Domain: A Case Study
In this talk, I examine the harms of advantage-taking in the epistemic domain through an especially hazardous case: a figure I call the “epistemic asshole”. A person behaves like an epistemic asshole when they exhibit a distinctive form of epistemic badness characterized not by gross irrationality or hostility to truth, but by a stable, entitled disregard for their epistemic relations with others. Drawing on Aaron James’s (2012) account of moral assholes, I examine how people can systematically exploit epistemic cooperation by allowing themselves special advantages—such as “freedom from inquiry”, “doxastic comfort”, and “freedom to criticize”—while remaining insulated from criticism by an entrenched sense of entitlement. The resulting view, the Relational View of Epistemic Assholes (REA), explains why this phenomenon is not epistemically the worst, yet is nonetheless deeply objectionable. After motivating the need to better understand this phenomenon, I show how REA captures both “impure” cases (involving both epistemic and moral assholery) and “pure” epistemic assholery, when a person’s objectionable conduct is driven directly by epistemic aims. I further explore connections between epistemic assholery and epistemic vice, and the causal role this phenomenon can play in active ignorance and epistemic exploitation. Through this latter connection, I argue that epistemic assholery plays an insidious causal role in sustaining objectionable social power dynamics. REA provides a valuable lens for understanding important but often-hidden hazards in our social epistemic environment. I conclude with some observations about the difference between using REA to understand and categorize epistemic hazards (including by applying it to oneself) versus using it to insult interlocutors.
Emily Berry
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