Description:

Citizens have better information on local officials than the distant central government, therefore delegation of authority via local elections improves the selection and performance of local officials. However, local officials under elections have no incentive to implement unpopular centrally mandated policies. Based on a large village-level panel dataset from rural China, this project shows that elections improve the implementation of popular policies, weaken the implementation of unpopular policies, and improve official selection. It sheds light on why the Chinese government has systematically undermined village governments twenty years after they were introduced.

Nancy Qian is the James J. O'Connor Professor of Managerial Economics & Decision Sciences at the Kellogg School of Management. Prior to Kellogg, Professor Qian taught at Yale University and Brown University and was a visiting scholar at the department of economics at Harvard University. Her research has been published in top academic journals and featured in media outlets such as the Wall Street Journal and National Public Radio. She is the recipient of numerous prestigious awards, such as the Alfred P. Sloan Fellowship, the Kiel Global Excellence Award, and National Science Foundation grants.

The Northwestern Buffett Faculty & Fellows Colloquium brings together an interdisciplinary audience to build awareness of global research on campus. This series promotes dialogue on scholarship and develops a deeper sense of community among Buffett Institute affiliates. Each meeting lasts one hour; lunch is provided.